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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20000556-CA

JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State has instituted its third appeal in this matter,
seeking to overturn the Trial Court's dismissal of the felony
charges, and to overturn the Court of Appeal's decision in State
v. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) .
This matter is before this Court pursuant to a certification by the
Court of Appeals under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule
43(a) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was the District Court correct in its dismissal of the refiled
felony counts, based upon State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986) and State v. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1989
(Utah 2000)?
The standard of review is one of correctness and clearly
erroneous.

For statutory interpretation, the correctness standard

applies; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d

1355

(Utah 1993); however,

findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(7) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah
1987) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann 76-9-704 (1996) is at the core of the felony
charges;

however,

standard

of

this

factual

appeal

findings

involves
and

case

the

clearly

erroneous

law

interpretation

of

Brickey, supra, and Morgan, supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Over four years ago, the defendants were charged with a felony
arising from an incident on January 6, 1996.

The lower Court has

dismissed all or part of the charges three times.
first

appealed

to

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals,

The government
lost,

sought

rehearing, lost, refiled more charges, lost half of those, appealed
to the Court of Appeals, who certified the case because the instant
issue

was

obviously

destined

for

this

Supreme

Court.

The

government fought the certification and, ultimately, the matter
was remanded to the lower Court who dismissed charges a third time.
The government appealed a third time, this time reversing its
previous position and seeking certification. The appellees did not
resist certification.
The third dismissal was premised upon the only decision in
this State defining "good cause," State v. Morgan, supra.

Therein

the clear, simple ruling is that "Evidence or witnesses previously
known,

available

and

unpresented
2

by

the

prosecutor

without

justification do not constitute good cause."
912.

Morgan, supra, p.

The instant case has precisely that fact pattern such that

unless Morgan is overturned, this is a frivolous appeal.
The government, despite three dismissals, three appeals, four
years of litigation, and the clear controlling ruling of Morgan,
as well as State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), argues there
has been no prosecutorial abuse and Mr. and Mrs. Redd's right to
due process is not implicated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The government sets forth some of the testimony elicited at
the two Preliminary Hearings.
regarding

the

initially

The key focus is their argument

omitted

but

available

testimony

that

"Ethnographic sources [say]:
that very often burials take place in that
midden area, because,
easy to dig

and

first of all,

especially with punitive

tools ... areas that are soft

and easy to

dig are very often the places - of
for - humans.

the

winter

repose

The second part being that

very often deaths,
in

it's

of course,

time

when

take place

lots

of

the

available ground is frozen and even harder
to dig, so those soft areas

in the midden

are very much utilized as burials.

Citing

"Case #2; Tr. 164; 9, 10".
Omitted by the State in their recitation of facts are the
3

following questions by counsel for the defendants and answers by
their expert:
Q.

But,

there

was

nothing

here

of

a

grave good nature, is that correct?
A.

No, not that I saw.

Q.

Okay# now,

concluded

as

this

I

understand it,

was a grave

you

because

the

bones were nearby, period?
A.

That and the very frequent association

of burials, of graves in the midden area.
Q.

Okay.

But that is a generic statement

for the Southwest; is that correct?
A.

That would be correct; yes.

Q.

Has nothing to do with this particular

spot

because

order
A.

there's

no

grave goods in

for you to tell what went on there?

Except to say

it is in the Southwest,

yeah.
skipping a few linesQ.
five

Do you even know if this is one versus
individuals

with

either

a toe,

a

finger, an arm, that sort of thing?
A.

No,

we

haven't

analyzed

the

human

remains to that extent
Case #2; Tr. pages 16-17.
underlining added)
4

(emphasis of

This Court, in State v. Redd, 992 P.2d
appropriately

addressed

"the

broader

986, 991

public

(1999),

policy

interpretation advances" and, through footnotes, referenced

our
to

articles from the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, regarding
older burial sites. Factually, in the instant case, the transcript
of the government's expert points distinctly away from a burial
site and by admission the generalities have no connection to the
instant case other than the fact the situs is in the Southwestern
United States. The Salt Lake Tribune, December 10, 1998 "Cannibals
of the Corners"; Ogden Standard-Examiner, September 7, 2000, "Tests
show cannibalism among ancient Anasazi Indians"; The Denver Post,
September 7, 2000, "Indian Cannibal Evidence Surfaces"; and Denver
Rocky Mountain News, September 7, 2 000, Associated Press, finds
"Cannibalism Evidence At Anasazi Site"; all show, factually, an
equal if not greater explanation as to what occurred in the instant
case.

There simply is a void of evidence supporting a burial and

a plethora of alternative explanations, including cannibalism.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The government and defendants agree that the focus of this
appeal is the viability of the refiled

felony charges in the

instant case.
Clearly the government had the power, as set forth in the
footnote of the Court of Appeals decision denying rehearing, to
refile the charges.

The question is whether the holdings of State

v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) and State v. Morgan, 997 P.2d
910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), combine to mandate the
5

dismissal of the newly filed charges.
The government concedes, at page 13 of their opening brief,
that "... the instant case does not involve new or previously
unavailable evidence ...?
The government

argues that

"Specifically, where the State

innocently miscalculated the amount of evidence necessary for a
bindover, and where a changed circumstance - the articulation of
new law by an appellate court - arose directly from the dismissal,
and where

defendants1

due process

rights

are

not

implicated,

neither the Brickev rule nor the due process rationale underlying
it present a bar to refiling."
The defendants respond that there is no bar to refiling, but
rather a bar to proceeding in lieu of "other good cause" and that
"other

good

previously

cause"

known,

does

not

available

without justification."

include

"evidence

and unpresented

by

or
the

witnesses
prosecutor

Morgan, supra, p. 912.

The government rests its argument as to good cause to refile,
on page 16 of

their brief, upon an excerpt

of a footnote in

Brickey, which refers to Harper v. Dist. Ct., 484 P.2d 891 (Okla.
1971).
which

The language quoted by the State, which is the water upon
the

government's

theory

floats,

is

"when

a

prosecutor

innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to obtain
a bindover."

However, materially and painfully harmful for the

government's position, is the missing preceding language in the
partially quoted footnote - "holding that good cause to continue
a preliminary hearing for further investigation might exist ...."
6

(emphasis added)

There is more.

Contrary to the quote on page

16 of the government's brief, their vaunted quote not only has a
beginning which sets it apart from this case, it also has an end
which qualifies it as being different from this case.
language,

after

the

word

"bindover"

is

...

investigation clearly would not be dilatory."

That ending
and

further

(emphasis added)

The operative language of Harper, supra, 895, is that to allow the
prosecutor unbridled discretion to refile dismissed charges "tends
to make a mockery of the meaning of

'due process of law' and

appears to place the District Attorney in a dictatorial position,
in relation to the judiciary."
The government also urges that "the articulation of new law
by an appellate court" is a "changed circumstance" which permits
a sustaining of a refiling.

However, the statutory interpretation

in State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), is not new law
but a straight forward interpretation of an old law.

The Court of

Appeals went to great length in discussing statutory construction,
citing Deland v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995); State v.
Scieszka,

897

P.2d

1224

(Utah Ct. App.

1995),

and

others

in

reaching its conclusion that the State must prove three elements elements

being

defined

in

Webster's

Third

New

International

Dictionary, p. 734 as, among others, "one of the constitutional
parts, principles, materials or traits of anything: one of the
relatively
complex

simple

forms or units

substance."

that

Identification
7

and

enter variously
enunciation

of

into a
simple

elements cannot be labelled "articulation of new law # " and there
is neither statutory nor case law support for that premise.
Finally, the State argues that State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860
(Utah App. 1998) "represents a better model from which to seek
guidance."

Fisk is a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

It

is also one that speaks to "new evidence" and specifically sets
forth ... "we do not address defendants' arguments that the 'other
good cause' prong of the Brickev test was not satisfied ..."
supra, p. 863.
the government

(emphasis added)
developed

The Fisk case shows evidence that

their new

hearing in a separate forum.

Fisk,

evidence

after

a

separate

In the instant case, the record is

void of any evidence as to why the government should be able to put
the defendants through three dismissals and three appeals.
The key is Brickey language - "unless the prosecutor can show
other good cause."
case,

the prosecutor

has

Brickey, supra, p. 647.
tendered

In the instant

nothing while

the Attorney

General's Office seeks to shift the burden to the defense.
not the burden of the defense to prove a negative.

It is

It is the

burden of the prosecutor to prove "other good cause."
Brickey prohibits a continuation of these charges.

Morgan

prohibits a continuation of these charges. Due process and common
sense prohibit a continuation of these charges.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT
IN ITS THIRD DISMISSAL OF FELONY CHARGES
Addendum F of the government's brief contains a reproduction
of the Order by the Trial Court sought by the appellant to be
8

overturned.
That Order contains the following factual finding by the Trial
Court/

labelling

as

"accurate

observation"

the

findings:
Brickey

does suggest

that a prosecutor's

initial miscalculation
evidence

might

of

justify

the quantum of
refiling.

Here,

however, it is not the quantum of evidence
that was miscalculated,
the evidence.

but the nature of

The State

did not fail

to

present enough evidence on March 20, 1997,
to prove a dead body

had been buried;

it

presented none, (emphasis added) (Addendum
F, p. 2)
The Court then went on to hold, legally:
Lack

of

new

evidence

and

innocent

miscalculation as to the evidence required
to obtain

a bindover

are

the

two areas

that Brickey and Morgan together set forth
as

insufficient

refiling

grounds

of charges

is those very claims
forth

in this case.

to

after dismissal.
that the State

a
It

sets

While the practical

application

of these cases

restrictive

on the prosecution,

of

and

Brickey

permit

Morgan>
9

may be unduly

this

in light
Court

is

magistrate's

compelled to grant the defendants1 motion.
State v. Brickey, supra, was a case of first impression in
Utah: what are the limits on the state's ability to refile criminal
charges when those charges have been previously dismissed
insufficient evidence?

for

The Utah Supreme Court found that the State

is not free to refile criminal charges under all circumstances.
"For

if

this

were

the

case,

the

State

could

easily

harass

defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been
dismissed for insufficient evidence.
fairness

preclude

discretion."
Thus,

vesting

the

Consideration of fundamental
State

with

such

unbridled

Brickey, supra, p. 647.
implicitly,

continuing

charges which have been previously

to

pursue

dismissed

refiled
for

criminal

insufficient

evidence is harassment unless there is an exception to the rule.
In* the instant case, the factual finding, viewed under the clearly
erroneous standard is that the State produced no evidence to prove
a basic element.

Thus, the factual rule in this case is that the

State failed to go forward both as to a key element and failed to
offer any explanation or "other good cause."
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to "find merit in the
approach taken by the Oklahoma courts."

Brickey, supra, 647.

The

case followed by Utah is Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim.
App.

1971) .

In Jones, the prosecutor must

show that new or

previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good
cause justifies refiling.

The burden is on the prosecutor.

In the

instant case, contrary to State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App.
10

1998) , the prosecutor has not introduced a scintilla of evidence
of

his

good

possibility

faith,
that

leaving

this

open

refiling

all

is

options,

politically

including
driven

by

the
the

government, not the prosecutor, by the huge amount of press and not
by the principles of due process.

At the lowest base fact, there

is a void of effort by the prosecutor to produce evidence of "other
good cause," contrary to the mandate of Jones, supra, and this
Supreme Court in Brickey, as well as demonstrated in Fisk, supra.
In Brickey, which adopts the Jones rationale, the reviewing
magistrate or Court must look "at the facts to determine whether
the new evidence (none claimed by the prosecutor here) or changed
circumstances

(none argued by the prosecutor) are sufficient to

require a re-examination

and possible

decision dismissing the charges."

reversal of

the earlier

Brickey, supra, 647.

The appellant takes from context, a part of footnote 5 in
Brickey.

The case cited is Harper v. Dist. Ct.#

484 P.2d 891

(1971), an Oklahoma case issued the same year, but after, Jones,
supra.

Harper

involved

a District

Court

interfering

with

a

magistrate's decision as to a bindover of a preliminary hearing.
Harper repeats the prohibition against another filing "unless the
State makes an offer of additional evidence or proves other good
cause to justify another preliminary examination."
897.

(emphasis added)

Harper, supra, 897.

Harper, supra,

Again, "In short, for good cause shown ..."

Equally importantly, the footnote in Brickey,

quoted by the State, refers to a continuance of a preliminary
hearing when the prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of evidence,
11

and

further

investigation would not be dilatory

- not

to the

refiling good cause that must be shown by the prosecutor.
State v. Morgan, supra, is a drug case, involving possession
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.

At the preliminary

hearing, the prosecutor chose to only call one witness, despite the
availability of the second witness.
one element, intent to distribute.

There was a failure to show
Morgan also repeats the clear

error standard as to factual findings, citing State v. Parra, 972
P.2d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) for the mandatory presumption that
the factual findings underlying the determination as to due process
violation are correct.
In Morgan, as well as Brickey, the prosecutor was prohibited
from proceeding on the refiled charges.

In Brickey, the prosecutor

failed to introduce any evidence of an element of the forcible
sexual assault.
same

In the instant case, the factual finding is the

- the prosecutor

failed

element of the charge.

to introduce any evidence of an

In Morgan, the testimony of the second

witness "contained no suggestion of new or previously unavailable
evidence."

Morgan, supra, p. 912.

Such is uncontested in the

instant case.
Morgan repeats the mandate - there is a prohibition "unless
the prosecutor

can

show

that

either

unavailable evidence has surfaced, or
exists to justify refiling."

(1) new

or

previously

(2) that other good cause

Morgan, supra, 912.

Clearly the burden is on the prosecutor.

(emphasis added)

In the instant case,

there was no attempt, no scintilla of evidence produced by the
12

prosecutor.
The holding in Morgan, supra, 917, is "Other good cause, as
described in Brickey, must at a minimum, be something beyond the
introduction of a witness who was present in the courtroom, sworn,
and

ready

to

testify at

the

first preliminary

hearing,

whose

testimony is known at the time and does not change in any material
way

after

witnesses

the

initial

previously

bindover

known,

is

dismissed."

available

and

"Evidence

unpresented

by

or
the

prosecutor without justification do not constitute good cause."
Morgan, supra, p. 913.
In the instant case, the government's expert, Dale Davidson,
was called at the first hearing, which resulted in the dismissal
and recalled at the second hearing "for some additional issues."
Case #2, Tr., p. 5.

Parenthetically, there was a stipulation that

the vehicle of the looters seen at the scene earlier in the fall
was not that of the defendants.

Case #2, Tr., p. 6-7.

Nowhere in

the transcript of the second hearing does the prosecutor proffer
even an excuse, much less a scintilla of evidence as is mandated
by Jones, Harper, Brickey, Morgan, and demonstrated in Fisk, that
the new Davidson testimony was somehow unavailable previously.
The appellant argues, using an extraction of Fisk, that, on
page

17, the Brickey rule

"ensures

that

the defendant

harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds."

is not

In the instant

case, the testimony by the government witness is that "there was
nothing here of a grave good nature, ... is that correct?" Answer,
"No, not that I saw."

Case #2, Tr. p. 16.
13

His clear testimony is

that he only concluded this was a grave (a place of intentional
interment) because of the bones nearby and the frequent association
of burials, of graves in the midden area.
statement

for the Southwest,

correct, yes."

is that

But, this "is a generic

correct?

That would be

Case #2, Tr. p. 17.

How more tenuous can the evidence be of interment than "a
generic statement" of the entire Southwestern region of the United
States?

There are no grave goods - a void of evidence of a grave.

More importantly, science now sees ample evidence of cannibalism
among the Anasazi (as set forth in the Summary of Argument).

The

unalterable fact is that this was not a grave.
The premise of Brickev is that it is harassing

to refile

criminal charges when they have been dismissed for insufficient
evidence.

ONLY when the prosecutor can show, can prove, "other

good cause," can the harassment be overcome. With a void of effort
in the transcript, there is nothing that argument can substitute,
for argument is just that - argument.

The evidence is in the

transcript - or, in this case, the lack of evidence or effort.
has

but

to

read

Fisk,

to

see

enormous

distinctions

One

with

a

difference in the position of the prosecutors in Fisk versus the
instant case.
The government poses the argument that at the first hearing,
neither the Court nor the defense addressed the missing element.
Thankfully our system is one of an adversarial nature.

It is the

prosecutor1s burden, light that it is, to put on some evidence of
the basic elements.

As the Trial Court observed and as quoted
14

already from appellant's Addendum F, p. 2,

the State did not fail

to present enough evidence on March 20/ 1997, to prove a dead body
had been buried/

it presented none.

(emphasis added)

The State persists in arguing that unless there is forumshopping or purposeful obfuscation of evidence through sandbagging#
there is no harassment.
that

is not

That is NOT the premise of Brickev and

the reality

of

children who have endured,

two Utah

citizens

and

their

economically and emotionally/

five
three

government appeals and repeated filings.
The State, using
"anchor/"

"casts

a

repeated metaphors

net/"

argues

that

of ships
Morgan

essential guiding principle of the Brickev rule.
solace

in

its

appellation

of

"Brickev1s

- "adrift/"

undermines

the

The State seeks

suggestion"

that

an

innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence necessary for
a bindover may in and of itself suffice as "another subcategory"
of "good cause."

The simple fact is that this is a Court of law#

not a Court of "suggestions."

The simple fact is that the State

ignores the mandate that the prosecutor must prove good cause - and
such was not even argued at the hearing.

Even their argument/ on

page 25# is that "the State plainly had sufficient evidence for at
least a bindover."
the

recipient

bindover?"

of

(emphasis added)
such

an

Hopefully the State is never

unrelenting

assault.

"at

least

a

Such statement epitomizes the refiling of a tenuous

case!
The ship of the State floats upon the premise that when the
prosecutor

innocently

miscalculates
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the

quantum

of

evidence

necessary for a bindover, they are able to attack again.
subjective argument is supported by nothing.
history of the case was presented.
finding of no evidence stands.

This

In Fisk, the entire

Not so here.

The factual

It is equally possible that the

driving force for the refiling is NOT the prosecutor, for there is
no record of why this all occurred.

Fisk hurts the State by

showing steps taken by the State as to new evidence versus the void
in the instant case.

Brickev and Morgan torpedo the ship of the

State.
CONCLUSION
The facts as found by the Court, the law of Jones, Harper,
Brickey, and Morgan, due process, and common sense, join together
to overwhelm the void of effort of the prosecutor to show "other
good cause."

This is not an Empty Grave, it is NOT a grave.

Generic statements are insufficient to subject Utah citizens to the
rigors of trial on a case described by the State's best advocate
as "at least a bindover."

Failing to put on any evidence of a

basic element is not "good cause."
here are undisputed.

Morgan is good law.

The facts

The Trial Court's dismissal should not be

overturned!
Respectfully submitted,
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